US and UK at the Cuban crossroads

At that time, the Liverpool, Birmingham, Sheffield and Wolverhampton Chambers of Commerce began to apply pressure in pursuit of their commercial interests in the Cuba, warning of the danger to British interests if the United States decided to annex the island or establish a protectorate there. The Liverpool Chamber of Commerce in particular recalled that, when the United States declared war on Spain, it had proclaimed that its action would be confined to freeing the Cubans, and thus committed itself to respecting European trade with the island. The Liverpool traders also proposed announcing a joint protest by a number of European countries: the United Kingdom, France and Germany against the signing of the Reciprocal Agreement. Given these demands, the Foreign Office committed itself to defending British trade and, in a subsequent response, clarified to them that there was no basis for thinking that Cuba would be annexed. British foreign policy experts similarly believed that there were no reasons for the imposition of a US tariff duty similar to the one maintained by Spain during the colonial period. Thus, it was not considered appropriate to mount a protest in those terms to Washington, although information about the three reports from UK corporations was made known there. .

Lord Paunceforte, the British ambassador in Washington, did acknowledge that once the political status of Cuba was defined, the United States would make efforts to obtain preferential advantages in trade by means of the agreement. However, it was his understanding that that did not present any legitimate basis for raising protests (Confidential Memo 7872, National Archives, UK, p 5).

The Cuban constitutionalists who travelled to Washington to renegotiate the Platt Amendment returned to the island empty-handed and had to absorb the cruel reality that unless they took accepted it, the US occupation would be maintained indefinitely. On June 12, in a close vote, the Constituent Assembly decided to approve the constitutional appendix. Between pressure and promises, the neocolonial status of the island had been stipulated. In any event, the phantom of the Monroe Doctrine remained concealed, closely surveying Cuba's steps in its relations with the European powers that might lead to competition with the nascent US imperialism.

By mid-1901 the British had concluded that it was virtually impossible to prevent the Reciprocal Trade Agreement between Cuba and the United States being approved. Their minister in Cuba, Lionel Carden, was authorised to continue his Havana lobbying in an ex officio capacity, although he received instructions that he should be cautious in his contacts with Cuban leaders. Marquis Lansdowne noted: "I think Mr. Carden may be trusted to do this tactfully and without giving offence to the US." (Letter from Carden to Villiers, August 10, 1901. FO 108/9). Faced with the threat hanging over British interests on the island, London prepared a counter-offensive based on a proposed trade agreement that would counteract the effect of the one being forged in Washington. In October 1901, after consultations between the British Foreign Office and Lord Pauncefonte and the Board of Trade, Carden received a copy of the trade agreement that the United Kingdom had proposed to Haiti, to serve as a model for a similar one with Cuba. He was also authorized to initiate talks on the treaty as soon as a government was constituted on the island (Memo (no name), October 21, 1901. FO 108/2).


The Reciprocal Trade Agreement

The message that President Roosevelt sent to Congress in support of a reciprocal trade agreement with Cuba and General Wood's announcement on the island of the need to put all hands to the plough alerted the British consul, who judged that those actions "clearly show that the United States would not be satisfied with a considerable domination of the Cuban market, but wants everything for itself." Carden took note of the opportunistic and hypocritical campaign mounted by the US government to those ends and added:

"In pursuing this end the Executive professes to be acting from purely benevolent motives and talks loudly of its moral obligations to lend a helping hand to Cuba by reducing the duties on sugar 'without which the island will be inevitably ruined' (…) The Cubans, as a people, have been quite taken in by the [U.S.] disinterested professions (…) and they have come to believe they are on the brink of ruin and nothing but reciprocity with the US can save them." (Letter from Carden to Villiers January 15, 1902, FO 108/9).

For its part, the Foreign Office, acting with extreme caution, was hopeful that the Cuban would start the fight which it did not dare initiate. Carden was given constant warnings to ensure that his meetings in Havana would avoid political issues that might discomfort Washington; that kind of balancing act they attempted to impose on their representative on the island had already deeply irritated him: "The political and commercial sides of the Cuban question are so interwoven that it is impossible to say where one ends and the other begins. Under the circumstances do you not think that the importance of the issue to us, and its urgency, would warrant a relaxation of these instructions, even at the risk of its not being altogether acceptable to the U.S. authorities?" (Kneer, 1975, p 71). After consultations Sir Lansdowne, foreign secretary, did not dare to run any risks whatsoever: "It will be safer to tell him that we are not prepared to relax our instructions" (Ibid).

But attempts to defend British businesses were not confined to official spheres. On February 25, 1902, the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution to ask the Chambers of Commerce of Manchester, Birmingham and Belfast to join it in mobilizing their members of Parliament and putting His Majesty's government in the picture concerning the threat hanging over their interests. Sir Lansdowne proceeded to warn the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce that he would categorically reject its suggestion that Britain should unite with Germany and France in a joint protest against the United States (Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, February 17, 1902; minutes of Carnbourne and Lansdowne; Letter from Lansdowne to Paucefonte, February 28, 1902, FO 108/9).

Nevertheless, on March 11, the foreign secretary received the afflicted businessmen, at which meeting Mr. Cox, vice president of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, confirmed that British trade with Cuba was in the order of 500,000 tons and amounted to GDP 2.5 million, thus making it necessary to maintain the 'open door' policy in commercial exchange with the island. Cox recalled that His Majesty's government had favoured the United States in the Far East with that same policy. Mr. Hawkes and Sir Barrington warned that the United States had launched itself into the war against Spain by alluding to philanthropic motives and now wanted to monopolise the island, while other delegates spoke out for trade protection in the textile and rice branches in particular. Although Sir Lansdowne thanked the businessmen for their clarity and good manners, he warned them that his government could not prevent a trade agreement between Cuba and the United States. On the other hand, he gave them the news that Minister Carden had been instructed to study a trade treaty with Cuba, and finally promised them that he would pass on a memorandum of their complaints to Lord Pauncefonte so that the latter, in a friendly manner, could forward them to the US government.

On March 10, 1902, Pauncefonte sent a missive to John Hay, US secretary of state, with a summary of the complaints made to him by the Chambers of Commerce of Manchester and Liverpool, in which he also asked President Roosevelt to take action to protect British trade with the island from the danger threatening it (Letter from Pauncefonte to John Hay, March 10, 1902, FO 108/9). Subsequently, the new ambassador in Washington, Michael Herbert, channelled protests against the initial draft of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement, which, in his view was "quite contrary to the policy of 'open door' so strenuously advocated by the US, and will create much irritation here." Secretary of State Hay replied that, for the moment, the U.S. policy towards Cuba had still not been clearly defined (Confidential Memo 7872, National Archives, UK, pp. 8-9).

In our view the United Kingdom could have promoted an international debate to demonstrate the contradictions that were arising between the Reciprocal Trade Agreement that the United States was imposing on its subject countries and the most-favoured nation treaties that the major powers were signing among themselves and with the rest of the world. The special privilege concessions granted by the Reciprocal Agreement were contrary to the postulates of the most-favoured nation status treaties, which placed all the countries that could benefit from them at the same level. As British historian W. G. Kneer aptly noted, the conflict was between "British non-conditionality" and "American conditionality." (Kneer, 1975, p 70). But the British were not disposed to wage that kind of battle.

In the United States, when the draft Reciprocal Trade Agreement reached the Senate its protectionist and anti-monopoly positions had been consolidated. At that point the beet farmers had publicly accused Havemeyer of trying to dominate the raw cane sugar market in order to displace the domestic sugar industry. In that way, the legislature concluded in July without reaching an agreement in relation to trade with Cuba.

In spite of the ambitions of the US executive in relation to the trade agreement with Cuba, the fact that the legislative had not approved it, as much due to political reasons as economic ones, gave rise in Cuba to a certain pessimism. Those favouring a close commercial alliance with Washington felt defrauded, while changes in the world sugar market were propitiating the island's economic recovery and reinforcing the clamour of the nationalist sectors opposed to Yankee oppression.

In the economic sphere, the possibility of revenge against the US giant - who had enchained Cuba with the Platt Amendment - could be perceived. In March 1902 the Brussels Convention, prohibiting subsidies for the production and export of sugar, was signed by the major producers and European consumers, which operated to the benefit of the sugarcane producers. In that context, on the one hand new markets were opened up to Cuban sugar in Europe but, on the other, European competitors in the US market were at a disadvantage in relation to the island. Our sugar had found in the London market an alternative to the US one.

From 1903 onwards prospects for Cuban sugar began to improve, with the increase of its price on international markets. That meant that Cuban sugarcane producers could compete at an advantage in all markets and, little by little, settle their debts. This reinforced their certainty that it was not essential to await Washington's last word.


British diplomacy

Cuba's frustration at the persistent refusal of the US Congress to agree a trade treaty advantageous to Cuban interests was reinforced when, in July 1902, the clauses for the reciprocal agreement proposed by the Roosevelt administration were announced. The Cuban government delayed its response to the proposal, having realized that it was in effect an attempt at an agreement without any reciprocity at all. Once the content of the bill for the Reciprocal Trade Agreement was known, a group of Estrada Palma's advisers managed to make reforms prior to the tariffs and tried to establish contacts with other countries to obtain commercial advantages. In that context it is worth noting that talks were initiated with Lord Pauncefonte, the British ambassador in Washington (Le Riverend, 1974, p 330).

Warned of the climate of frustration in Cuba, the US government did not wait for the reply of its counterpart in Havana and initiated a whole campaign of threats and pressure aimed at weakening it. Gonzalo de Quesada, the Cuban minister in Washington, was warned that the Cuban government should not dare to demand reductions of more than 20% on Cuban products, as that would lead to a breakdown in the negotiations underway. American troops on the island executed manoeuvres amounting to a show of force and finally, in order to avoid any foreign support for Cuba, the United States delivered a complaint to the British Foreign Office informing it that their ambassador in Havana, Lionel Carden, was trying to ruin Cuban-US relations (Oscar Zanetti: 1998, pp. 262-263).

These warnings to the British diplomatic representation in Havana resulted from the fact that, on June 13, 1902, US Minister to Cuba, Herbert Squiers, had demanded explanations from the Cuban government on the trade treaty being explored by Cuba and Britain. It was then that Squiers warned Estrada Palma that the United States was opposed to the treaty under discussion because it was endangering the reciprocal agreement being discussed in Washington, and which the US Congress still refused to consider (Le Riverend, 1975, p 83). Referring to the trade agreement being negotiated by the British and Cubans, an indignant Squiers stated: "I cannot believe that the Cuban government is seriously considering England as a market (…) the Cuban government is preparing to make the best possible agreement without considering what it owes to the United States." He added that he knew via Fermín Goicochea that the sugar planters had changed their minds and were now supporting trade relations with Europe. On Goicochea, he said that he was from that class of Cubans "who were ready to sell their souls to the benefit of their pockets. They do not love or respect our flag or any other. They are lacking in gratitude, lacking in any sentiment that is not mercenary" (Pérez, 1999, p 378).

In June 1902 Foreign Office officials, fearing a public debate in the British Parliament on the Cuban question, had to channel demands from companies in their own country. Once again, Lansdowne had to raise complaints with the U.S. State Department, but this action met with silence from Washington. (Kneer, 1975, p 71). On the other hand, the British representation in Cuba was making gestures to the Caribbean government as a way of confronting the U.S. imperialist pretensions. In mid-August 1902, Carden met with President Estrada Palma to advise him on the disadvantages for both the Cuban and British parties in relation to the possible agreement with the United States.

Carden explained how prejudicial it could be for Cuba in the long term, given that would alienate other nations and restrict both trade relations and foreign capital investment. For his part, Estrada Palma stated that he was very impressed by the London minister's arguments, as they gave the matter a new focus. He affirmed that he had never lost sight of the possible damage that the reciprocal agreement could inflict on British interests and that he would do everything possible to mitigate them, but Cuba itself, more than the government leading it, was deeply committed to that agreement and thus it would be very difficult for him to abandon it. In a letter from Carden to his superiors in London, he stated that the Cuban president's desire to cultivate relations with the United Kingdom and his offer to heed the suggestions of His Majesty's government seemed genuine, but always "without giving offence to the United States" (Letter from Carden to Lansdowne, August 14, 1902. (FO 108/9).

By mid-1902 opposition in Cuba to the reciprocal agreement had revived, as highlighted by Minister Carden in one of his letters. Public opinion had realized that its signing was not a matter of life or death for the planters, because the price of sugar had risen due to the collapse of the beet harvest in Europe. He also pointed out that members of the Senate and the House of Representatives were against the excessive reduction of tariffs on US products and concluded: "There is no doubt that the opportunity the United States unquestionably had, at one moment, of obtaining commercial control over Cuba with the fullest acquiescence on the part of the immense majority of its people has passed, never to return" (Letter from Carden to Lansdowne, September 29, 1902. FO 108/9).

Britain continued making efforts to sign a trade agreement with Cuba that could offer it similar prerogatives to those offered to the United States. But, from the outset, London found itself with the problem that the agreement couldn't be extended to the tariff regime, according to Minister Carden: "Although we have not as yet discussed the proposed commercial treaty in detail, the (Cuban) secretary of state informs me that he has found nothing to object to in the draft I submitted to him except for the clauses providing for the most favoured nation treatment in regard to import duties, which would not be compatible with the conclusion of a Reciprocity Treaty with the United States" (Letter from Carden to Lansdowne, September 29, 1902. FO 108/9).

The Cuban refusal to include tariff reductions in the treaty being negotiated with London prompted dissatisfaction and doubts in the Foreign Office; a report from that office noted that the initial incentive had been lost: "The Cuban reply is now under consideration, but it involves a wide departure from our proposals, and the acceptance of a treaty of such a restricted character would be such a bad precedent for the future that there seems good grounds for informing the Cuban government that we must altogether decline to negotiate on the basis which they suggest." The report added that that position was doubtless due to the Caribbean government's desire to satisfy the demands of the reciprocity treaty proposed by the United States with the consent of Britain so as to thus facilitate its approval in the Cuban Senate (Confidential Memo 7872, p 11).

Finally, on December 11, 1902, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement was signed on the US side by Tasker Bliss and, on the Cuban side, by Carlos de Zaldo and José María García Montes, secretary of state and the treasury, respectively, who sealed their signatures at the president's request. However, Bliss had to acknowledge sensing in Cuba "a very disagreeable feeling, inimicable to any treaty." A few years later, in mid-1906, the treaty with Britain succumbed to pressure from Washington on the Cuban government. The future of Cuba was in the hands of Uncle Sam.