The International Journal of Cuban Studies

(Online) ISSN 1756-347X

Washington's relationship with Havana and Caracas

Jessica Vorstermans examines the parallels in US foreign policy vis-à-vis Cuba and Venezuela

Summary

The amount of ink spilled on critiquing, defending and analyzing the long-standing United States foreign policy on Cuba could fill the 90 miles of sea between the two countries. Despite criticism from the academic left, and some factions of the right, the US policy line and accompanying discourse on Cuba has remained virtually the same for almost half a century. Washington has consistently considered Cuba and the Castro government a "threat to regional stability, the consolidation of democracy and the free market economies in the Western hemisphere and for the people of the US" (Commission for the Assistance to a Free Cuba: 8). Currently, we are seeing an emergent discourse that is focused on the relationship between Castro's Cuba and Chávez's Venezuela. In a statement entitled 'Venezuela: Terrorism Hub of South America?' the US Principal Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism states "[Chávez] will continue his close relationship with Cuba's dictator Fidel Castro. Castro has a long history of fomenting subversion in Latin America and elsewhere... Castro and Chavez are using a variety of means to try to help individuals who share their worldview come to power via the electoral route" (US Department of State 2006). Increasingly the negative US discourse used against Castro is now being used to describe Chávez, and a shift to similar policy responses is also becoming evident. This paper is intended to open a critical discussion on lessons learned from decades of Cuban-US discourse and relations, which will be used to analyze current relations with Chávez in an effort to provide foundational and exploratory arguments advocating for a move away from the recycling of old discourse and policy that we are currently seeing in US foreign policy.

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Introduction

Although United States foreign policy concerning Cuba has undergone changes over the years, it has remained focused upon two main goals: total victory over communism and the ousting of the Castro brothers. The means by which total victory is to be achieved are primarily based on the long-standing embargo. President Bush recently reiterated support for this policy in October of 2007, stating "I also urge our Congress to show our support and solidarity for fundamental change in Cuba by maintaining our embargo on the dictatorship until it changes" (Bush: 2007). Additionally, we see that the U.S. discourse has not changed, and the naming of Castro as the dictator of a "tropical gulag" (Bush 2007) continues. More recently, with the rise of Chávez in Venezuela, the narrative from the Whitehouse is becoming similarly centered around the defeat of Chávez, although less dogmatic than the entrenched narrative vis-à-vis the Castro regime (1).

President Bush's 'new' Cuba policy

President Bush outlined his new Cuba policy in October of 2003. Essentially, the policy is not new, given that it has simply reiterated the decades long reaffirmation of political and economic sanctions. However, it does also put forward a detailed agenda for a post-Castro Cuba (Gratuis 2005: 10). This detailed agenda has been critiqued extensively, with the Inter-American Dialogue voicing concerns over the degree to which the agenda suggests that the US take unilateral action (Inter-American Dialogue 2004: 3). Additionally, the implementation of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba was outlined. The mandate of the Commission is as follows:

"The Commission will consider the elements of a comprehensive program to assist the Cuban people to establish democracy and the rule of law, create the core institutions of free enterprise, modernize infrastructure, and provide health, housing, and human services" (US Department of State 2003).

President Bush's Venezuela policy: more of the same?

Michael Shifter highlights the fact that Washington has been out of step in its dealings with Chávez, with its policy decisions being sometimes "adversarial, sometimes conciliatory - and too often confused and contradictory" (Shifter 2007: 1). Firstly, United States policy vis-à-vis Venezuela is clearly more moderate than its Cuba policy as Venezuela and the United States do not share the complicated history that characterizes relations with Cuba. However, we are beginning to see clear parallels between the two policies and certainly in the naming of Chávez, with a recycling of the discourse used to name the Castro government. With the change of administration to President Bush a more isolationist policy was ushered in, with an emphasis on regime change (Piccone & Youngs 2006: 130). Currently there exists a visibly antagonistic relationship between Washington and Caracas, with fighting words being exchanged from both sides:

"Donald Rumsfield compares Chávez to Hitler; George H. W. Bush calls him an ass… Chávez meanwhile, denounces Bush [Jr.] as an assassin, a coward, a drunk, a donkey, a birdie and, most famously, the devil. Condoleezza Rice calls Chávez a tyrant who is 'really, really destroying his country'…" (Wilkinson 2008).

Climate of ideological polarization

To begin with, the political and ideological climate that exists between the three countries must be addressed. It is evident that a publicly confrontational relationship exists between Cuba and the United States, and Venezuela and the United States, with hostility emanating fiercely from all three countries. The highly charged ideological and political situation that characterizes relations between the United States and Cuba has coloured US foreign policy concerning the small island for decades. Now, analysts are making the same observations regarding Venezuela. Michael Shifter states in a Special Report of the Inter-American Dialogue that "the highly polarized situation in Venezuela under Chávez poses an obstacle to rational policy dialogue" (2007: ix). He goes on further to explain that Washington has always been two steps behind what is happening in Venezuela with Chávez in power and this has led to faulty foreign policy decisions (Ibid: ix).

This paper will explore, in a comparative and contrastive manner, the discourse and policy of the current Bush administration vis-à-vis Cuba and Venezuela, highlighting similarities and differences. It will be argued that we are beginning to see elements of the failed US Cuba policy in regards to US relations with Venezuela, ignoring lessons that should have been learned throughout decades of interaction with Cuba. Furthermore, special attention will be allotted to the role of discourse in relations between Cuba and the United States, and Venezuela and the United States. The three main areas that will be focused on in this paper are: the discourse of the Bush administration vis-à-vis the Castro and Chávez regimes; US support and backing of domestic opposition groups in each country, irrespective of their methods of dissidence and opposition; and US support of extra-constitutional and illegal attempts at ousting the Castro and Chávez regimes.

Narratives and labels

The discursive battle between Cuba and the United States has been ongoing for almost half a century, and Washington's naming of Fidel Castro, as a power-hungry and cruel dictator intent on the ruin of his country and the destabilization of the region, has been relatively consistent. President Bush has not deviated from this discourse, branding Fidel Castro as the head of a "criminal regime victimizing its own people" (Bush 2007: 4). Michael Bhatia reminds us of what these fighting words mean: "the purpose of the discursive conflict is to attain a victory of interpretation and ensure that a particular viewpoint triumphs" (2005: 7). The 'victory of interpretation' is essential in the discursive battle as it essentially sets the stage for how an actor is portrayed, and in many cases it also shapes and guides policy. It is important to recognize that a name or a label cannot accurately portray an actor, because they act in a multiplicity of ways and are malleable and changing entities: therefore, by essence, they cannot be explained by a single, epithet. However, this fact is often obscured by the repeated usage of the label by powerful political establishments and their agendas. Normative associations, characteristics and motives are attached to the named subject, creating a powerful narrative that overshadows any attempt at objectivity or truthfulness (Bhatia 2005: 8).

The naming of the Castro regime as 'criminal' and 'totalitarian' has created an environment in which a confrontational and isolationist US policy has been able to survive for many years, despite not being able to achieve its stated goals. This discourse has succeeded in transcending the reality of enormous imbalances in terms of size, population, economy and military capacity, between the two countries. The narrative states that Cuba is still seen as a threat to the people of the US, thereby meriting a confrontational and isolationist policy, irrespective of the island's actual resources.

While Fidel Castro is still portrayed as the "old, obsessed … Cuban dictator", repeated with dogmatic certainty, we are now seeing the rise of an equally negative discourse about Venezuela's Chávez as "a self-absorbed, unstable strongman … who has made common cause with terrorists and the regimes that support them" (Waller 2005: 1). Washington's discourse about the Castro regime's regional interference is now being recycled in describing Chávez. The current focus is on Chávez and his country's great oil wealth that is being used (allegedly) to fund leftist activities, rebels and governments in Latin America. The name of regional destabilizer, accompanied by normative assumptions and dogmatic characteristics, is also being associated with Chávez in the region. "The Bolivarian regime in Caracas presents a clear and present danger to peace and democracy in the hemisphere" (Waller 2005: 14). The result of using the same discourse to describe the two régimes is the transfer of normative assumptions and characteristics irrespective of the realities on the ground.

William M. LeoGrande, Professor of Government at American University, explains that Chávez is confronting this US discourse in the same way that Castro did after he took power in Cuba; with a "message of defiance: 'we will not take orders from you anymore'". This message is not just directed at Washington, but also at Chávez' domestic and regional audience (Youngers 2007: 28).

Civil society and opposition groups

Another element of Washington's Cuba policy is the funding of civil society opposition groups on the island and within the influential exile community. Susanne Gratius states that under President Bush's 2003 Cuba policy there has been an increase in funding to opposition groups (2005: 15). This support will "inevitably be seen by Cuban officials as part of an effort to undermine the Cuban government" (Farley & Thale 2004: 5). With President Bush's Cuba policy centered around the "expeditious end of the Castro dictatorship" (Inter-American Dialogue 2004: 1), any groups funded under this policy are to be seen as a threat to the sovereignty and stability of the state by the Cuban government. The infamous Black Spring is evidence of the counter-productive results of funding opposition groups on the island. Furthermore, there are questions about which opposition groups are given funding, how transparent the process is to solicit funding and what types of opposition activities are carried out using this funding (Farley & Thale 2004: 6). Due to bureaucratic and political concerns, the funding of opposition groups is mostly channelled through US non-governmental organizations, of which many are run by hard-line Miami exiles (Erikson & Neeper 2007: 468). This only fuels speculation and ideological accusations over how and where the money is spent.

All of these factors have weakened and de-legitimized civil society opposition on the island and have impelled some dissidents to distance themselves from any US involvement. Oswaldo Payá expresses this nationalistic feeling: "Do not ask the Cuban opposition to define itself according to one or another line conceived from the outside; you (on the outside) should define yourselves in favour of the Cuban people" (FRIDE 2005: 24).

Similarly, Washington has focused on funding opposition civil society groups in Venezuela in an attempt to accelerate change from within the country. As in Cuba, this support has been unsuccessful and rife with problems. It has been problematic for several reasons; one being the fact that opposition groups in Venezuela have resorted to violence and extra-constitutional means in achieving their goals (2). US support of such groups weakens its rhetoric on supporting peaceful and democratic change in the country. Secondly, this support has only furthered the domestic view in Venezuela that the United States is "aggressively seek[ing] regime change" (Lapper 2006: 26). This acts as reinforcement for Chávez's nationalist rhetoric and anti-US sentiments rather than fomenting anti-Chávez opposition, which is the projected goal of such support. Lastly, US support of opposition groups in Venezuela creates the perfect opportunity for Chávez to echo Castro in naming such groups as instruments of US imperialism (Youngers 2007: 5). This appeals to the nationalist feelings of the domestic population and serves to de-legitimize any opposition groups that choose to accept US support. Furthermore, it reduces the public space and opportunity in Venezuela for the voicing of political discontent and dissidence, which is contrary to the desired effect of the US policy.

Régime change and coups d'état

It is no secret that the United States has gone to great lengths to oust Fidel Castro; everything from botched assassination attempts to the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. Using the discourse of naming the Castro regime as a destabilizing force in the region, Washington has attempted to end the Castro regime over several decades. Yet the world watched as Fidel retired by his own will during the 50th year of the Revolution, promising to continue to fight in the battle of ideas. Washington has remained consistent in its policy objective of ending the Castro régime. The Inter-American Dialogue has expressed concern over the discourse used to define the end goal of the Cuban policy in the 2004 report released by President Bush's Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba. They draw attention to the violent nature of the report and its rhetoric of "anticipat[ing] violence" when the anticipated period of transition happens on the island (2004: 1). The report creates the impression that the US government places the ousting of the Castro regime as the fundamental policy goal, irrespective of how this goal is achieved (Ibid: 1). This interpretation is adeptly used by the Castro regime to continue its enemy discourse against the United States, utilizing the vast amounts of confrontational rhetoric from Washington as fodder.

We are beginning to see the same interpretation of events in Venezuela as US discourse has increasingly been centered on naming Venezuela as a destabilizing force in the region. Antonio José González Plessman, Diagnostic Coordinator of the Venezuelan National Commission for Police Reform, explains that "similar expressions by the US government have in other circumstances resulted in direct intervention" (Youngers 2007: 19). This has stoked fears of US aggression in Venezuela, with Chávez drawing on these anxieties when he denounces US aggression in Venezuelan domestic and regional affairs.

As explained above, from 1998 onwards the United States government has channelled funds to opposition and civil society groups in Venezuela, much like they do with opposition groups in Cuba. Closer ties between opposition leaders in Venezuela and United States Republican party members and associates became more pronounced as Chávez's government soldiered on with its Bolivarian Revolution. Allegedly, one month before the April 2002 coup d'état, the International Republican Institute (IRI) hosted a meeting in Washington, bringing together Venezuelan opposition groups and Pedro Carmona, who assumed power after the coup (Clement 2005: 70-73).

Furthermore, Mark Eric Williams notes that the US actually appeared to support the coup d'état that ousted the democratically elected Chávez, with a government official replying to the Washington Post, "[t]hat is not a word we are using" when asked about the recent coup (2005: 162). The Bush administration released twelve official statements supporting the coup in one week, clearly painting a picture of support and acceptance (Piccone & Youngs 2006: 140). In a statement released by the U.S. Department of State entitled "Venezuela: Change of Government", the government change was not called a coup d'état, but a transitional government. This deliberate choosing of words is significant when compared with the reactions of the rest of the region. The US decision not to name the ousting of Chávez a coup was out of step with the regional community, as a total of 19 Western Hemispheric leaders "quickly condemned the coup and threatened to invoke sanctions under the Inter-American Democratic Charter" (Williams 2005: 162). The International Crisis Group noted in its May 2004 Latin American briefing on Venezuela that the US had seriously undermined its credibility when it recognized Chávez's overthrow and then did not reject the coup immediately (ICG 2004).

Consequently, on a domestic level as well as a regional level, the United States was seen as taking sides and supporting an unconstitutional coup d'état, thereby effectively weakening its bargaining power as an outside third party. From 2002 onwards we began to see organizations such as the United Nations Development Program and the US-based Carter Center as outside actors working for change in Venezuela, with the US government playing less of a role in direct developments inside the country.

When the 2002 coup failed and Chávez was re-instated to power, he asserted, with his usual rhetorical flair: "now this administration [George W. Bush] has truly broken with all protocols of democracy and respect for people. The coup d'état against Venezuela was manufactured in Washington. My death was ordered" (Kozloff 2006: 2). While the U.S State Department categorically disputes the legitimacy of Chávez's claim (3) the impact it had upon domestic support in Venezuela is undeniable (Lapper 2006: 33-34). The perception of US intervention in Venezuelan domestic affairs has undoubtedly helped Chávez in the polls, mimicking the support Castro enjoyed after the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion. Moreover, the US decision to name the coup d'état government in Venezuela a transition government, and their deliberate decision to refrain from denouncing what was widely accepted as an unconstitutional coup d'état by the rest of the region, allowed Chávez to effectively name the US as complicit in the coup. Chávez's naming of Washington as an imperialist power intent on meddling in the domestic affairs of Venezuela was strengthened, allowing him to use this event to gain domestic support.

An increasingly isolated foreign policy

American foreign policy regarding Cuba differs greatly to that of other major actors on the world stage. Continued US support of the embargo that is widely seen as inefficient and perhaps even counter-productive, acts as an irritant in relationships with other countries in the region (Washington Office on Latin America 2007: 12). The European Union, Canada, and many Latin American countries have taken very different routes in dealing with Cuba, preferring a policy of dialogue and engagement over economic isolation and confrontation. Additionally, there is great disparity between the conceptions of Cuba in the future, with the US preferring a liberal Cuban democracy with a strong emphasis on a market economy. This sits in contrast to the European preference for a more social democratic system, and other countries in Latin America place, broadly speaking, a large emphasis on popular democracy and social justice (Gratius 2008: 67).

Parallels can be drawn with regards to the United States' relations with Venezuela, with its discourse and policy decisions becoming increasingly distanced from those of the rest of the region, and the European Union's. When Chávez assumed presidency in 1999 the European Union had little interest in the domestic affairs of Venezuela. It had zero common policy towards the country and gave a very small amount of aid to the Andean nation (Piccone & Youngs 2006: 132). In contrast to the US involvement surrounding the 2002 coup d'état, the EU paid little attention to the events. However, afterwards it began to advocate for peaceful conflict resolution and supported the idea of a national dialogue. Post-2002, the main focus of the EU has been a "permanent call for elections and electoral monitoring", with no significant funding of long-term projects promoting democracy and human rights (Ibid: 141) (4). While there is much diversity within Latin America, there is now a "clear majority of countries seeking autonomy in international relations, [and] greater independence from the United States" (Youngers 2007: 24). Chávez has been able to use oil to forge many regional relationships, and has provided economic support to friendly governments such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua (Youngers 2007: 21). Additionally, Venezuela is on good working terms with Argentina and Brazil, the large economic players in the region. Despite a few exceptions in the region, Colombia being a good example, Washington's confrontational narrative and increasingly isolationist rhetoric out of step with other actors on the world stage.

Erroneous labels

The politics of naming surrounding Castro and Chávez has added to the simplistic belief that the two men are essentially one and the same, a belief that is partly shaped and influenced by mainstream US media. Brian Latell, a former senior analyst on Latin America in the American Intelligence community stated "[Chávez] is getting that advice from his mentor in Havana. Castro knows how to exploit divisions in the US and now the teacher is training his star pupil" (Prillman 2003: 30). While both the Cuban and Venezuelan governments have visibly antagonistic relationships with Washington, there are some major differences that need to be addressed.

It would be erroneous to label Venezuela as the Washington's 'new Cuba', as there are clear differences in the two countries' relationships with the United States. Firstly, Venezuela and the United States are, and will remain, highly interdependent due to the former's vast, but hard to refine, oil deposits and the latter's thirst for petroleum for the millions of cars that drive the roads of the world's largest consumer state. This no doubt plays a large role in the maintenance of US relations, however frosty they are, with Venezuela, as it is in the national interest of America to maintain uninterrupted economic ties with Venezuela. Therefore, the prospect of economic sanctions on Venezuela is quite unlikely. This important economic factor was not an issue with Cuba, as Cuba's largest export, sugar, was easily replaced when the embargo was put into place in 1960.

Secondly, Chávez has been elected with large majorities since 1998 when he was elected as President, only suffering his first defeat in the polls when the December 2007 Constitutional referendum was narrowly voted down. Moreover, he has welcomed international observation (for example by the Organization of American States and The Carter Center) in all national elections.

Lastly, there is no particularly complicated history between Venezuela and the United States, as there is between Cuba and the United States. There is not a large and influential exile community of Venezuelans living in the United States and there is much more distance between the two countries. These differences, coupled with the fact that the same confrontational and isolationist discourse and policy line have proven to be ineffective in dealing with Cuba, necessitate a fresh look by Washington at its relations with Chávez and his Bolivarian Revolution.

Lessons learned?

Washington's painting of Castro as an autocratic strongman strangling his country has worked in creating an environment in which US Cuba policy has been allowed to survive after almost a half century, despite the fact it has failed in achieving its stated goals: the ousting of Castro and the fall of communism. Currently, analysts from the US left and right point out that the same discourse of demonizing Chávez is not working to make Venezuela more democratic and is in fact playing into Chávez's hands (Lapper 2006: 17). Margarita López Maya, a Venezuelan academic, supports this belief, explaining that a confrontational US policy simply bolsters support for Chávez domestically and benefits the "hard-line sectors within Chavismo" (Youngers 2007: 8). Furthermore, if Washington continues to covertly support domestic opposition groups within Venezuela, it will continue to be viewed as a non-partisan outside actor, a meddling superpower whose actions are ideologically motivated. This greatly erodes any legitimacy behind Washington's claims that Chávez is attempting to influence regional governments (Lapper 2006: 31).

Looking to the future: US relations with Cuba and Venezuela

Dan Erikson and Kate Neeper point out that the overall Cuba policy currently enacted by the Bush administration contains very few tools to achieve the goal of democratizing Cuba. They emphasize that it has become "almost entirely rhetorical in nature" (2007: 460). There is a real danger that this could also happen in Venezuela if the same failed discourse and policy is applied to the Chávez government. Like they do with Fidel Castro, the more Washington challenges Chávez with their confrontational discourse and meddling criticisms, the easier it is for Chávez to describe the United States as the hegemonic bully intent on destroying his Bolivarian Revolution. It also allows Chávez to cultivate stronger ties with regional allies, justify calls for a regional military force and entrench his domestic support.

Sounds familiar? Of course it does: it is straight out of the US-Cuba relations history book. Steve Ellner explains: "Powerful establishment groups have always had a special fear of charismatic leaders with a radical discourse who implement policies that have the potential for setting off far-reaching change" (2008). But unfortunately old habits die hard, and in the face of the dreaded word 'communism', Washington has shown itself unable to think rationally. At this present time, if Washington does not take a more objective policy stance vis-à-vis Venezuela, they are likely to find themselves again left out in the cold.

Jessica Vorstermans completed this essay while following the OHCHR MA programme in Conflict Studies and Human Rights at Utrecht University in the Netherlands (2007-2008). She is currently working in the field of peace education at the senior high school level in Canada.

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Notes

(1) The author would like to draw attention to the fact that the current state of affairs in Cuba are changing, thereby creating the danger of dating some of the academic literature and policy documents referenced in this paper, for example those referring to Fidel Castro as head of the state and not Raúl. However, Susanne Gratius reminds us that Helms-Burton law prohibits recognition of any Cuban government headed by either Fidel or Raúl (2008: 2). Therefore, the term 'Castro regime' will be used in these cases.

(2) Piccone and Youngs state that in the period leading up to the 2002 coup d'état in Venezuela, the United States "openly and actively supported the opposition movement, including its violent political street protests" (2006: 130).

(3) See The United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of the Inspector General (2002) A Review of U.S. Policy Toward Venezuela: November 2001-April 2002. Report number 02-01G-003, July 2002 for a thorough analysis, with accompanying documents, of the US response to the April 2002 coup in Venezuela.

(4) One EU country, Spain, has played a larger role in Venezuelan domestic affairs; see Piccone & Youngs, 2006, pages 141-143 for a detailed account of this relationship.

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Copyright for this work is held jointly between Jessica Vorstermans and the International Journal of Cuban Studies under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative 3.0 Licence
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