Globalisation and Cuba

In 1989, with communism disintegrating and global capitalism empowered, Francis Fukuyama issued his triumphalist statement proclaiming an "end of history" in which the world had arrived at "the final form of human government" based on markets and democracy. At the same time Fidel Castro (2007: 386), despite Cuba's appalling predicament and precisely because of the above events, reaffirmed that he continued to believe history was on the side of revolution and not globalisation, stating, "I was fully convinced that it was the other way around, and that it [globalisation] had to be resisted. This is the certainty I had then". He, and the Cuban leadership, therefore decided to "wait patiently, for globalisation to collapse".

Although we are now experiencing a global financial crisis, which most informed observers believe will result in a long recession or worse, it would be premature to claim that Castro has been absolved; and yet unwise not to acknowledge that the corpse of history is stirring. Most importantly, today's crisis brings into sharper focus the contest of ideologies that the two momentous predictions made above infer. With global capitalism in difficulty and its future uncertain, the world's last remaining socialist experiment gains a renewed relevance.

The problem remains, however, that the hegemony of almost 30 years of "market fundamentalism" (Soros 1998) has not only sought to put an end to history but also, logically, to ideology. The latter does not respond in synchronisation with material developments and we are, in the main, still captives of our own mythology, unable to imagine anything outside of market liberalism's 'discourse of the given'. This tendency is not absent from academia, despite its claims of objectivity.

Because of this "suffocating consensus" (Borosage 1995), Cuba continues to be seen by mainstream academia as either a socialist anachronism in a global capitalist system or a tenacious little nation whose history and revolutionary tradition have given it the strength to continue to chart its own course. Both of these perspectives are valid in the context of their separate ideologies and are represented by strong academic arguments. However, as Castro's statement above infers, Cuba has a grander vision of its destiny. To give a foundation to this third perspective it is necessary to critically assess both globalisation and Cuba's approach to socialism from within the intellectual framework of each.

Globalisation is a complex and elusive process that has invited a multitude of definitions and interpretations and is the subject of much controversy. Most analysts would agree, however, that it has a historical background and, in economic terms, it is principally associated with the deregulation of international finance in the 1970s; a technological revolution, especially in microelectronics; and a transformation of production processes. It is also generally accepted that such developments are complemented and facilitated by ideological and political changes that have taken place during the last two decades of the twentieth century, principally the rise of neo-liberalism and the collapse of the Soviet-style communism. While it is pointless to claim one 'correct' interpretation of globalisation, as divergence itself is mainly the product of ideology rather than empirical fact, it is perhaps useful for the purposes of juxtaposition with Cuba to view it from a political economy perspective.

Transnational space

For its contemporary theoretical champions, including Fukuyama (op.cit.) among many others (Omae 1990, Redwood 1994, Barnevic 2001, Wolf 2004), globalisation represents a logical and necessary extension of market forces into transnational space. In a human context it is succinctly described by Thompson (1992:182) who envisages an atomised world of individuals existing as "free standing agents, each equipped with his or her distinctive set of preferences, and each transacting on an equal footing with whosoever it pleases him or her to transact with". Globally, "it is not just the world financial village that is in the making. It is the international car, global fashions, intercontinental telecommunications, worldwide brands and the global consumer… people … with similar ambitions and styles based on 'democracy and capitalism' (Redwood 1993:22). Such an ideal is defensible in theory but, in practice, difficult to implement.

It is true that the liberalisation of capital in a period of advanced modernity and technological innovation created the first truly global system, leading to what one author has described as "the end of geography" (O'Brian 1992). The globalisation of finance in turn facilitated the globalisation of production and the formation of enterprises that "know no national boundaries" (Reich 1992:124). Since the 1980s these twin processes have transformed the organisation of world production, distribution, the apportionment of profits and patterns of consumer demand. But this transnationalisation of capitalism has also led to the formation of a "transnational capitalist class" (Sklair 2001) and the emergence of a "transnational state" (Robinson 2007), in which the latter stretches from supranational agencies like the IMF and WTO right down to local government which is increasingly being organised to serve the interests of global capital.

However, this process has not led to an idyllic world for the global consumer based on 'democracy and capitalism', but a concentration of elite power in transnational space. Although a small proportion of the world's population has become materially better off under globalisation, the majority have faced increasing poverty and political and economic exclusion, especially in the developing countries (Milanovic 2008). Inequality has increased dramatically, and democracy, politics, economics, culture have been influenced disproportionately by the imperatives of unaccountable global forces. Largely free of national level controls the "New Olympians" (Elliot & Atkinson 2008) who control this system have been able to indulge their whims in the name of the market. Today their project is facing problems and resistance as the prime mover of globalisation - transnational capital - spins out of control after inducing a debt and leverage inflated boom for the past ten years. For Fidel Castro (2007: 398) this is a time when objective factors are producing the conditions for subjective change, therefore the logic of his statement, "what we are [pursuing] is the battle of ideas".

Social processes

Does Cuba represent an embryonic alternative to this faltering system, one which can draw not only on its own experience with socialism for the past 50 years, but also a powerful historical anti-capitalist current? A theoretical perspective on the Cuban revolution's socialist process is given by the social scientist Heredia (1993: 64) who states:

"Socialism is ... a process of successive upheavals not only in the economy, politics and ideology but in conscious and organised action. It is a process premised on unleashing the power of the people, who learn to change themselves along with their circumstances. Revolutions within the revolution demand creativity and unity with respect to principles and organisation and broad and growing participation. In other words, they must become a gigantic school through which people learn to direct social processes. Socialism is not constructed spontaneously, nor is it something that can be bestowed".

As with the neo-liberal vision stated above, socialism's theoretical ideals are difficult to achieve in practice. The Cuban insurrection of 1959 took the world by surprise and was seen as a fresh new revolutionary experience, which appeared to shun the staid soviet model of communism and seek a form of popular and participatory socialism. Che Guevara - the iconic revolutionary guerrilla - became an international symbol and modern-day saint, who embodied the idea of not just building a new society and a 'new man' (sic) in Cuba, but also exporting the revolution to the rest of the world. However, while the 1960s in Cuba was a period of popular involvement in the process of change, one author has suggested that what was taking place was "command-mass participation" (Petras 1973: 289): in other words, that the general population did not become involved at the higher levels of decision making.

In the 1970s Cuba seemed to move closer to its Soviet protector, as demonstrated in 1972 when the island joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). This served to further centralise and bureaucratise the command structure. However, there were initiatives such as the formation of Cuba's local government system called 'Poder Popular' which sought to give citizens more local democratic power and deepen their participation in the revolution. The so-called sovietisation of Cuba ended with the rectification programme of 1986 - which, according to Cuba's leaders, was an attempt to return to the consciousness-building of the 1960s. Nevertheless, nothing could have prepared Cuba for the collapse of Soviet communism as the island suffered a greater economic contraction in peacetime than perhaps any country in the 20th century. In the 1990s survival became the only 'revolutionary' objective. In 2004, 14 years after the Soviet debacle, Fidel Castro claimed: "the great hero in this feat [Cuba's ability to hold its revolutionary course with some success] has been the people, who have contributed tremendous sacrifices and immense trust. Our survival has been the result of justice and of the ideas planted over 40 years of revolution. This genuine miracle would have been impossible without unity and without socialism"(Castro 2004:4).

An alternative model?

Although Castro's comment is valid in general, since Cuba lost its Soviet protector and entered a world in which capitalist globalisation rules, it has experimented with market mechanisms and many Cubans have adopted non-socialist views as to how they might build a future. Indeed, in the mid 1990s it seemed that Cuba was about to enter a period of 'transition'. This option is now less likely as the core nations in the capitalist world are facing a deep economic reversal and the prospects for any small developing country moving closer to the core are inauspicious- let alone for Cuba with its alternativist tradition.

The Cuban revolution has only partly attained the idealistic revolutionary and socialist goals that some of its leaders and intellectuals have articulated, but it can count itself among some of the most progressive socialist experiments in history, alongside such articulations of popular power as the Paris Commune, the early Russian Soviets and the revolution within the Spanish Civil War. It also still represents not just a socialist alternative to neo-liberal capitalism as embodied in globalisation, but a distinct ontology. While neo-liberals believe in individualism, competition, markets, procedural democracy and the survival of the fittest, Cuban socialism champions (with varying degrees of success) encouragement of the 'social individual', co-operation, distribution according to need, participatory democracy and protection of the weak. In practice these ideals have resulted in some impressive achievements in health care, local decision-making, popular consultation and the ability to survive crisis while maintaining a respectable degree of social equity.

Since the early years of the Cuban revolution this alternative model of development - which claims adherence to socialism - has impressed and influenced people around the world. This is especially so in developing countries, some of which have benefited from Cuba's assistance and expertise. Today, however, Cuba's significance and symbolism as an alternative is being complemented by a parallel movement in the form of a growing counter-hegemony to global capitalism. In Latin America in particular, new social movements have grown over the past two decades and these have begun to take actions corresponding to the ideals of socialist behaviour that Cuba exposes in theory and delivers in practice.

The wider move to the left in the region has been dubbed a 'Pink Tide', implying a softening of harsh neo-liberal measures rather than radical change and, in general, I would argue this is an accurate perception. However, any visitor to Venezuela, Bolivia or Ecuador and many other countries in Latin America, who is witness to popular mobilization and organisation, must realise that besides soft political change there is also a growing popular consciousness and action that are beginning to shape events. Cuba is highly involved in the region, both at a local level and through its leading role in the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (Cole 2008 in this issue), which proposes a regional structure of co-operation based on need instead of profits. In the above context, Cuba is not exporting revolution, as one might argue was the case from the 1960s to 1980s, but forming a symbiotic link with resistance to global capitalism. In the author's view this is how the Cuban revolution will be sustained and developed in the future.

There is no certainty that Cuba can overcome its own internal problems - or that what is happening in Latin America will consolidate its socialist orientation. But, as globalisation is in meltdown, it is now incumbent on academics to consider the possibility of alternatives, especially in the so-called developing world. In this context the Cuban revolution becomes more than an anachronism in a global capitalist system and instead, a possible catalyst of necessary historical change.

George Lambie is Co-Director of the International Public Administration Unit, De Montfort University, UK and visiting Professor at the University of Havana.

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Copyright for this work is held jointly between George Lambie and the International Journal of Cuban Studies under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative 3.0 Licence

IJCS Volume 1 Issue 2 December 2008