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US Cuba policy after Bush: succession or transition?

Stephen Wilkinson reviews the possible outcomes of the US presidential elections and the implications for changing relationships with Cuba.

Summary

For almost 50 years the United States has pursued a policy of bringing about regime change in Cuba, through a series of measures. The main plank of US policy - enduring though its historic rationale ended with the Cold War - has been the economic embargo, which has equally proved a failed strategy. With Castro's retirement, some observers believe that the US will find it easier to soften its line. President George W. Bush's official policy towards post-Castro Cuba is to prevent what is seen as a 'succession' of the one party Communist regime and to help instigate a 'transition' towards a western liberal free market model. The proposal might rather be reversed and applied to the United States itself: will the end of the George W. Bush presidency herald a succession of the embargo policy or will there be a 'transition' towards a different approach to the island? This article will examine some trends in the US that point in the direction of change, including public opinion in Florida and the attitudes of the current presidential candidates. It argues that this year, for the first time, Cuba may become an election issue in the US.

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US Cuba policy

Current US policy towards Cuba

As the Cuban American scholar Louis Pérez Jr. has commented, the US embargo policy is not only a failure but an anomaly and an anachronism:

"It is derived from assumptions that long ago ceased to have relevance to the post-Cold War environment, designed as a response to threats that are no longer present, against adversaries that no longer exist. The security imperatives that originally justified sanctions, based on the proposition that Cuba was an instrument of Soviet designs, to be contained on every occasion and countered at every opportunity, are no longer plausible." (Pérez Jr., 2002: 228)

Furthermore, as a restraint on trade and capital flow, the embargo is out of step with the economic wisdoms that underpin the globalization project. It therefore puts US credibility at risk, and annoys its allies, a factor that is illustrated by the annual UN General Assembly vote in which all of the US's closest allies vote against it (in October 2007 the vote was 184 to 4 with one abstention).

The major Washington policy think tanks, including the very influential Inter-American Dialogue and the Council on Foreign Relations, currently argue that the embargo policy ought to be changed (Aronson and Rogers 1999; Sweig 2007). Even conservative foreign policy veterans such as Henry Kissinger are opposed to the policy (see, for example, Lippman, 1996). So the question to address is: how does the embargo survive?

The most immediate answer is a five-letter word: Miami. Through their grip on Florida politics, the well-organised and well-funded extreme rightwing Cuban American lobby has been able to use the US electoral system to its advantage. It thus exerts a control over Cuba policy that has been sufficient not only to stifle most attempts to change it - but also to introduce new measures that have made it stronger (Erikson 2002:3).

The power of this Miami lobby stems from the growth in power and influence of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), an organisation that began under the Reagan administration in 1980. By generously funding the CANF via ostensibly 'independent' donor bodies such as the National Endowment for Democracy, the Reagan administration helped to build it into a lobbying force that uses tactics adopted from the Jewish American Foundation (Calvo Ospina 2002:32-34; Vanderbrush and Haney 1999: 390-2). As a consequence, in election after election, the CANF was able to influence outcomes, not only in Florida but nationwide. By targeting negative advertising at any electoral hopeful who suggested a softening of policy towards Castro, the CANF made it deeply unattractive for candidates to bother with the Cuba question. On the other hand, through generous contributions, the CANF made it very worthwhile for candidates to support hard-line anti-Castro policies.

Thus, after the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet threat had vanished, the CANF was able to influence lawmakers in Washington to pass ever more draconian economic sanctions against Cuba. By careful timing in election years, it was also able to tip presidents into supporting the measures - even when they had declared they were opposed to them (Castro 2001: 18, Vanderbrush and Haney 1999: 394-405).

As a consequence, current US policy towards Cuba has become a web of measures: in part laws passed by Congress; in part executive orders made by successive presidents; and in part the application of even older laws passed against other countries in times of war and still on the statute books (Rennack and Sullivan, 2005). Many commentators, including the Cuban government and Cuban academics, tend to see this web as a 'Gordian knot' (Castro 2002: 2) that cannot be undone. However, a review of the most salient aspects illustrates that this apparent complexity may obscure an inherent fragility.

Commission Report for Assistance to a Free Cuba 2004/2006 (Travel and other restrictions on Cuban Americans)

The measures adopted by President George W. Bush in 2004 restrict the right of Cuban Americans to visit their family in Cuba and place a ceiling on the amount of money they may send to Cuba. These measures have ironically done more to damage the pro-embargo cause in Florida than any other measure. By directly affecting the rights of Cuban Americans and their ability to help their families in Cuba, the Bush administration has opened an unprecedented breach in Florida politics. In the current election race, the three incumbent Republican Cuban American congressional representatives who support these policies are facing Democrat candidates who are campaigning against them. The measures are classed as 'executive orders' and thus can be removed by a future President without recourse to Congress. Presidential candidate Barack Obama first, and then Hillary Clinton later, have both said they oppose these restrictions (CANF Voter Guide, 2008).

The Helms-Burton Act 1996

This law, as well as trying to slow investment in Cuba from third countries, was also an attempt to codify the embargo into law and limit the powers of the president to lift it. The law stipulates the conditions in Cuba that must prevail before the president can end the embargo. By thus trying to make the embargo a domestic policy issue, the Helms-Burton Act is an attempt to step on the constitutional prerogative of the President in making foreign policy. This means that it is vulnerable to a strong-willed President who could challenge Congress, use the presidential prerogative to make foreign policy and circumvent some or even all of its measures. This is what Clinton did in 1996 when signing the law without enacting Title III, the part that would penalize foreign investors in Cuba. He also claimed an exception when he relaxed the US citizen's rules of travel in 1999 (Wilkinson, 2000) (1).

The Torricelli Law 1992

This law was aimed at preventing trade with Cuba from third countries. Its most famous measure was to extra-territorialize the embargo by making it illegal for US subsidiaries in third countries to trade with the island, a ban that had been lifted during the Carter presidency in the late 1970s. George W Bush has been applying this legislation more assiduously than any other president with the consequence that some cases have recently made embarrassing headlines. For example, when Sheraton Hotels in Mexico ejected a Cuban delegation in 2006, huge public demonstrations resulted in the government fining the hotel chain. A bank in Austria taken over by a US bank in 2007 is also being fined. In the UK, the Hilton Hotel group has attracted a negative backlash from trade unions for similarly refusing to take Cuban clients (see Campbell, 2007). If ever there was a law that the presidency could challenge, it is this one.

Travel restrictions for non-Cuban Americans

This is a throwback to the Cold War and is a particularly unpopular aspect of current US policy. The US International Trade Commission estimates that if the restrictions were lifted, up to 1.1 million US citizens would travel to Cuba in the short term (see United States International Trade Commission, 2007). This would immediately increase the number of tourists visiting Cuba by up to 50 per cent. The regulation of the restrictions is in the hands of the presidency and by only partially lifting it, as Clinton did by tweaking the licensing regulations in 1999, a US president, by suddenly allowing more US citizens to visit Cuba, could bring about a serious alteration in the Cuba-US relationship almost overnight.

Food sales exception

Despite the hard-line rhetoric, it is ironic that the Bush administration has overseen the biggest expansion in US-Cuba commerce since 1959. Currently, Cuba is buying more food from the US than from any other country and has said it would buy a lot more (USITC, 2007). This is because Congress passed a bill in 2000 to allow food exports to Cuba - and Bush has allowed this trade to go on, albeit with some severe regulations over payments. These restrictions, which make it imperative for Cuba to pay in cash up front for any food it buys, are a prime target for alteration because the measure is supported by mid-western senators, many of whom are Republicans and are lobbying on behalf of their constituents. The regulation of the payments is a presidential prerogative and a president so-minded could make it much easier for Cuba to buy food without recourse to Congress.

Gordian knot or leaking ship?

In both Havana and Washington it is often said that the Helms-Burton Act - by codifying the embargo into law - made it impossible for a President to alter, since to repeal a law requires a two-thirds vote in Congress. But in fact, as can be seen from the foregoing, there is plenty of room for the president to make changes to the embargo without recourse to Congress. When Clinton challenged Helms-Burton in 1999 his administration was questioned on this point and the response was robust: Clinton's adviser James Dobbins said that in their interpretation, Helms-Burton merely delineated where a president could alter policy as s/he saw fit.

"Helms-Burton codified the embargo and at the same time, it codified the president's licensing power. That is, it codified a process by which there was an embargo to which exceptions could be granted on a case-by-case basis by the President." (Dobbins quoted in Brenner, 1999:42)

Clinton's other Cuba adviser, Richard Nuccio, also said that a president could do almost anything s/he wanted:

"When President Clinton signed the Helms-Burton law, his administration issued a statement saying that it does not restrict the right of the executive branch to make foreign policy. In its own view, the administration has the legal authority to make any changes in the embargo that involve regulatory powers, and that is just about everything." (Nuccio, 1999)

The slight adjustments made by Clinton at that time allowed for a considerable increase in numbers of US travellers to Cuba. The principle was to promote exchange between Cubans and US citizens, rather than keeping the two populations apart. The desire to keep exchange to a minimum lies behind the 2004 restrictions in travel placed by George W. Bush on Cuban Americans. Thus a new President who begins to reverse this trend will also be reversing a principle upon which the embargo is sustained. In this context, any switch towards greater engagement with Cuba, however slight, will be a significant break and will encourage more exchange, especially in those areas where US self-interest is evident - such as food sales - which have substantial lobbying forces behind them.

Thus, rather than a Gordian knot, the embargo may be better described as a leaking ship, that would capsize were it not for the efforts of its supporters who are busy trying to block up the holes. Any president so-minded could hasten the sinking by using their powers to make more small holes. The next president would not be without congressional allies in trying to do this: since their victory in the midterm elections in 2006, the Democrats have introduced a large number of bills aimed at softening aspects of the embargo, as I have highlighted above.

Congress and the embargo

As an indication of the levels of activity around the embargo, the number of bills in Congress are illuminating. In May 2007 there were eight bills in Congress that would lift aspects of the embargo as opposed to only one that would strengthen it (2). Such activity might reflect more the fact that those opposed to the embargo have all the work to do, but nonetheless there is a detectable mood within Congress against the current policy. None of the bills had any chance of being passed before the election in November meaning that the next president is inevitably going to have to deal with them.

There are two factors making it likely that Congress will move more decisively after the elections to alter US Cuba policy. The first is the death in early February of Representative Tom Lantos, a Democrat from California who was the head of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He was a staunch anti-communist who worked assiduously to prevent embargo-easing legislation from leaving the committee stage. Lantos' replacement is Howard Berman, also a Democrat from California, who is of the opposite stripe: he has sponsored bills aimed at lifting the travel restrictions. This means that procedural delays that have dogged such legislation may be removed (Radelat 2008).

The second factor is that a number of Republicans - who formerly supported the embargo are retiring - and their replacements do not share their views. There are more Republicans facing re-election than Democrats - and more Democrats favouring change are likely to be elected. A key battleground is Florida itself where the Republican incumbents face a particular challenge (Radelat 2008). Waves of Cuban migrants after the 1980s have brought about a demographic shift in Florida so that there is no longer a homogeneous Cuban American community.

Elián meets the China syndrome

Daniel Erikson of the Inter-American Dialogue think tank has commented that congressional attitudes and US public opinion towards the Cuba policy have undergone a sea change because of what he calls the 'Elián meets the China syndrome' (Erikson 2002: 3). The case of Elián González, the young Cuban boy who was kidnapped by the Miami lobby in 2000, brought the irrationality of Florida's anti-Castroism to widespread public attention (Wilkinson 2000: 44-5). By highlighting the embargo at a time when the US was deepening and broadening its relationship with China, the Elián crisis revealed it contradictory nature.

The Elián affair had another, perhaps even more significant, effect. In its aftermath, the Cuban American rightwing splintered. Its more hard-line members formed what is known as the Cuba Liberty Council (CLC) who are behind the Bush administration policy on Cuba - while the CANF has now become an advocate of a somewhat softer line. This split in the leadership of the Cuban American Florida community reflects the demographic change that is now directly affecting the presidential race. It is also a reflection of a broader trend in the general public mood towards the embargo and Cuba. It appears that the US population is growing tired of the embargo policy. For example, a nationwide Gallup poll conducted in February 2008 for the newspaper USA Today showed that 61 per cent of respondents favoured re-establishing US diplomatic relations with Cuba. (For a full list of polls showing the growing trend in US public opinion on Cuba policy see http://www.pollingreport.com/cuba.htm )

A year earlier, an Associated Press-Ipsos poll showed 62 per cent in favour. Similar percentages of voters wish for the travel restrictions to be lifted: a Fox News poll conducted in 2002 found that 63 per cent of participants wanted to travel freely to Cuba. More significantly, within the Miami Dade Cuban community, the figures show a majority now supporting a re-establishment of diplomatic relations. A Florida International University poll of Miami Dade County residents conducted in February 2007 found that 57.2 per cent supported a restoration of diplomatic relations. 65 per cent of respondents said they would support a dialogue with Cuban government, (this compared with 55.6% in a similar poll in 2004). Although a majority of 57.5 per cent said they still support the embargo this figure had dropped from 66 per cent in 2004. Most importantly however, 64 per cent said they support a return to the policies governing travel and remittances that pertained in 2003 before the Bush administration tightened them.

With a majority in Miami Dade wanting a return to the travel policies of 2003, this has become a key element in the current election race because the Democrats have chosen to fight the current Congressional election on this issue (see, for example, Southern Political Report, 'Florida's Three Cuban Representatives Face Challenges' February 25, 2008). Two prominent Cuban Americans, the former head of the Cuban National Foundation and former head of the local Democratic Party, Joe García and the former Mayor of Hialeah, Raúl Martínez, are running against rightwing Cuban-American Republicans Lincoln and Mario Díaz-Balart respectively. A Colombian American Democrat, Annette Taddeo, is opposing Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. Speaking on BBC News 24 on February 19th about Fidel Castro's retirement, García said it was time for "a more pragmatic policy towards Cuba." This contest has now spilled over into the presidential race, making this the first election since the Cold War that the candidates will have contested over Cuba policy. In every presidential election since 1989, the candidates have always tried to 'out-tough' each other when it comes to Castro. But this time the Democrats are campaigning for an easing of the travel restrictions on Cuba Americans. It is my view that the effect on the future of the embargo could be profound.

Presidential hopefuls

Now that Hillary Clinton has left the race for the Democratic nomination, there are clear differences between the presidential candidates. Flanked by the Republican Cuban American rightwingers Ros-Lehtinen and the Díaz-Balarts, Arizona Senator John McCain could not have been more explicit in his support for the Bush policy on Cuba:

"My administration will press the Cuban regime to release all political prisoners unconditionally, to legalize all political parties, labour unions, and free media, and to schedule internationally monitored elections. The embargo must stay in place until these basic elements of democratic society are met." (McCain, 2008)

In stark contrast, Barack Obama has indicated that he would be willing to lift the restrictions on Cuban American travel:

"There are no better ambassadors for freedom than Cuban Americans. That's why I will immediately allow unlimited family travel and remittances to the island. It's time to let Cuban Americans see their mothers and fathers, their sisters and brothers. It's time to let Cuban American money make their families less dependent upon the Castro regime." (Obama, 2008a)

Obama has gone further, expressing willingness to talk to Raúl Castro without preconditions (see Obama, 2008b). Such a policy shift would not necessarily be controversial. Writing in The Miami Herald on August 21, 2007, Barack Obama couched it as being helpful to bringing about the downfall of socialism in the island:

"Cuban-American connections to family in Cuba are not only a basic right in humanitarian terms, but also our best tool for helping to foster the beginnings of grass-roots democracy on the island." (Obama, 2007)

The then head of the Miami Democratic Party, Joe García, interviewed in CubaEcuentro (Madrid, May 17, 2007) endorsed this intervention:

"I agree with the fact that Cubans ought to be able to travel to Cuba. Possibly the biggest error Washington has committed with respect to Cuba are the limits on travel imposed by the administration of George Bush in 2004 because the policy imitates the policies of Fidel Castro in the sense that it divides the Cuban family."


The possibility of change in US policy towards Cuba

The forthcoming US presidential election is likely to be split between the two main contenders on Cuba policy - and the effect of the split could be significant. If one candidate favours even a slight easing of the embargo on Cuba, this increases the possibility that the next president (be it McCain or either of the Democrats) will change policy. To illustrate this, I have created two charts (Figures 1 and 2), which plot the possible outcomes of the presidential election with regards to Florida (that is, whether or not the winning candidates win with the help of Florida or without it) against the possible permutations of the balance of party forces in the Houses of Congress.

Currently, both Houses are controlled by the Democrats, but with very flimsy majorities. Although the issue of the embargo is bi-partisan - with Democrats and Republicans in both camps - there is a more widespread sympathy for a softening in policy towards Cuba among Democrats. The Cuban American Florida representatives who vehemently support the embargo are Republicans. Thus, if the Democrats win stronger control of both Houses after November 2008, the possibility of change in this direction would be greater than if the Republicans recover control of one or both of the Houses.

If the Democrats were to try to 'out-tough' the Republicans on Cuba (as in 2000 when Gore tried to court the Florida vote by saying he would not send Elián back) then the outcome of the presidential race, whoever won, would produce a result that would make it extremely unlikely for a softening in Cuba policy to take place. This is because neither candidate would have a mandate to alter the current policy. Indeed, if they were to win in Florida, having campaigned to stay tough on Cuba, they would have a mandate to do the opposite.

CANF Voter Guide (2008) 'Cuban American Voter Guide,' January 24. Available at http://www.cubalibre.com

Clinton, Hillary (2008) Democrat Primary debate 21 February, Texas 2008, reported in 'Obama ready to meet next Cuban leader,' Calgary Herald, Canada, Friday, February 22. Available at http://www.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/story.html?id=f1449ee8-14ce-44fa-aec2-cca8907b22fd

Erikson, Daniel P. (2002) 'The New Cuba Divide,' The National Interest, 67, Spring pp 1-7.

Luxner Larry (2008) "'Embargo foes" 2008 strategy to focus on unseating Florida's Díaz Balart brothers,' Cubanews, 16:1.

McCain, John (2008) Speech in Miami on 20 May, reported in New York Times. Available at http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/20/mccain-now-hammers-obama-on-cuba/

Obama, Barack (2007) 'Our main goal: Freedom in Cuba' Miami Herald, 21 August. ---------------- (2008a) Speech in Miami 23 May, reported in Baltimore Sun. Available at http://weblogs.baltimoresun.com/news/politics/blog/2008/05/obama_defends_engagement_with.html

---------------- (2008b) Democrat Primary debate, 21 February, Texas 2008, reported as 'Obama ready to meet next Cuban leader,' Calgary Herald, Canada Friday, February 22.

Nuccio, Richard (1999) 'US Policy toward Cuba is schizophrenic,' Business Week, 27 October.

Pérez Jr., Louis A. (2002) 'Fear and Loathing of Fidel Castro: Sources of US Policy toward Cuba,' Journal of Latin American Studies, 34. 2. 227-54.

Peters, Philip (2007) 'Chairman Joe Speaks,' The Cuban Triangle Blogspot, May 16. Available at http://cubantriangle.blogspot.com/2007/05/chairman-joe-speaks.html

Radelat, Ana (2008) 'Rhetoric aside, U.S. policy toward Cuba won't change in 2008,' Cubanews 16: 3 March.

Rennack Dianne E. and Mark P. Sullivan (2005) U.S. - Cuban Relations: An Analytic Compendium of U.S. Policies, Laws and Regulations, Atlantic Council, Washington DC.

Sweig, Julia (2007) 'Fidel's Final Victory,' Foreign Affairs 86, 1, January/February: 39-56. United States International Trade Commission (2007) 'U.S. Agricultural Sales to Cuba: Certain Economic Effects of U.S. Restrictions'. Available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/pub3932.pdf

Vanderbrush, Walt and Patrick J. Haney (1999) 'Policy toward Cuba in the Clinton Administration,' Political Science Quarterly, 114, 3, Autumn: 387-408.

Wilkinson, Stephen (2000) 'Riding on a wave of change: the Elián crisis and prospects for an end to the US Cuban embargo,' Soundings: A Journal of politics and culture, 15, Summer 2000: 27-49.


Copyright
Copyright for this work is held jointly between Stephen Wilkinson and the International Journal of Cuban Studies under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative 3.0 Licence

IJCS Volume 1 Issue 1 June 2008